University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Philosophy Faculty Publications

Philosophy

Fall 1974

Intention and Interpretation in Art: A Semiotic
Analysis
Gary Shapiro
University of Richmond, gshapiro@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/philosophy-facultypublications
Part of the Esthetics Commons, Philosophy of Language Commons, and the Philosophy of Mind
Commons
Recommended Citation
Shapiro, Gary. "Intention and Interpretation in Art: A Semiotic Analysis." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33, no. 1 (Autumn
1974): 33-42. doi:10.2307/428944.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

GARY SHAPIRO

Intention and Interpretation

.

1n

Art:

a Semiotic Analysis

the first philosopher
to note the distinctive puzzle, verging on
paradox, which marks our dealings with
art. Works of art seem to place us under an
obligation to interpret them and yet we are
convinced that our interpretations will
never be exhaustive. Kant attempts to account for this peculiar phenomenon by
talking of "purposiveness without purpose"
or of the aesthetic idea as "a representation
of the imagination to which no concept is
adequate." We are constrained to see some
pattern or organization in a work of art
and this is typically understood as a teleological or purposive organization which we
may feel tempted to attribute to the intentions or experiences of some rational agent;
yet we do not complete this attribution because it seems as if there is always some
additional or more complex purposive pattern which escapes our comprehension. For
Kant the phenomenon is to be understood
in terms of the types of judgment and the
need to find some link between the worlds
of nature and of freedom; and it is important for his theory that he demonstrate that
art is beautiful only insofar as it approximates to the beauty of nature. Others with
similar metaphysical interests have introduced concepts like Schopenhauer's will or
Hegel's absolute idea to cover roughly the
same ground. Those who are dissatisfied
KANT WAS PERHAPS
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with such speculative schemes have suggested that the puzzle can be dissolved
either by discovering a way of identifying
the meaning of a work of art, by adopting a
completely relativistic account of artistic
meaning, or by abandoning talk of meaning and interpretation in favor of talk
about aesthetic surfaces or physical objects.
What I want to suggest is that the apparent puzzle becomes somewhat intelligible
when we understand the work of art as a
sign. For a sign, as defined by Peirce, is something that stands for something to someone
(or to another sign). So that a sign is constrained or limited in meaning by its own
nature and its object, but open to
interpretation because it must address some
interpreter (or, more technically, it must
have an interpretant). Now in order to
make good this suggestion it is necessary to
examine some aspects of the sign-relation.
For it has been claimed, on plausible
grounds, that semiotic theories of the arts
are radically deficient insofar as they are
unable to give either an account of the way
in which the sign is representative of its
object or of the nature of the interpretant
in art. Charles Stevenson has suggested that
although a semiotic aesthetics must be committed to demonstrating the iconic character of signs in art, no adequate description
of this iconic character has yet been given.
He also claims that the theory is unable to
provide a way of specifying the proper interpretant in the artistic situation and notes
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that in practice we find an indefinite plural- generally do not need to refer to objects of
ity of responses to works of art which do some given sort; and art proverbially is said
not seem to cluster around a single paradig- to be unconstricted in its choice of matematic meaning.l While these objections rials and subject-matter.
The failure to say anything more at this
may reflect some actual weaknesses in some
to
me
it
seems
semiotic
however, provides ammunition for
of
point,
aesthetics,
types
that the central ideas of the theory may be the thesis that all generalizations about art
strong enough to withstand the criticism. are either trivial or false. Now in talking
Once these problematic areas are properly about the objects of signs another sort of
explicated the theory may also help us to approach is available. If we cannot initially
restate Kant's puzzle. Peirce, who intro- limit the range of possible objects we may
duced the semiotic terminology, provides be able to say what the mode of representasome useful distinctions, although he never tion is by which the sign is related to its
was explicitly concerned with the way that object. Here the most frequent suggestion
signs function in art. So while it may be has been that works of art are icons of their
possible to follow him part of the way, objects, that is, that they resemble their obsome caution should be employed in appro- jects in some way. So landscapes, like phopriating his ideas. The account which fol- tographs, resemble the scenes that they are
lows is somewhat skeletal; if it is viable, of, and music, it has been claimed, bears
however, it provides a way of talking about some structural similarity to the emotions.
significance in art which is not forced to The relation of resemblance may assume
accept one of the several unsatisfactory the- more or less complex forms: Peirce distinories which purport to discern a single and guishes images, diagrams, and metaphors
unique meaning in each work. It should which resemble their objects by qualitative
also, if viable, be capable of explicating dif- similarity, structural analogy, or by repreferences among various arts and providing senting "the representative character of a
a framework within which a plurality of representamen by representing a parallelpossible relations between artists and their ism in something else." 2
Nevertheless it seems to me that iconicity
audiences may be understood.
is not the central representative relation in
art. For one thing, there are many icons such
I
as reflections in mirrors or roadmaps which
To consider a work of art as a sign is, are clearly not works of art. My photograph
among other things, to treat it as having an and Constable's painting may both be
object or being a sign of something. Here iconic of the same landscape, yet my "picproblems arise when we try to say what, in ture" may be intended, used, and undergeneral, are the objects of art-signs and how stood as nothing more than a reminder of
it is that the sign represents its object. my travels, while Constable's is felt, with
Many suggestions fail because they are not good reason, to have some further signifisufficiently comprehensive; there are just cance. The further significance here might
too many counter-examples. So if it is sug- be expressed by saying that Constable's
gested that the object of an art-sign is an painting not only resembles the scene but,
assertion, it is not difficult to counter this among other things, should be regarded as
claim by referring to abstract paintings or an intentional representation of it. So far
non-program music where assertions can be this suffices to distinguish the painting from
detected only by an enormous effort of casual reflections but not from photographs
imagination. We may deal in a parallel and maps. Now although all of these may
fashion with the suggestion that the object be intentionally iconic, we characteristically
of all artistic signs is some particular emo- dwell on the intentional iconicity of the
tion (Clive Bell) or an emotion of some painting in a way which we do not when
general type (Tolstoy). This discovery considering the tourist photograph or the
should not be too disconcerting, for signs roadmap. In the latter cases an interest in
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the fact that someone meant the things to
be iconic arises mainly when the things fail
to resemble or when we look at them as
symptoms of personal biography. We may
not be able to read the map, or we may
wonder why the photographer cut John off
at the neck.
In order to explicate this difference it
may be useful to distinguish various sorts of
representation at this point. While an icon
resembles its objects in some way, an index
is connected with its object existentially, for
example by pointing to it or being an effect
of it. A symbol represents its object by
means of an association of ideas, a convention, or a law. While a sign may represent
in more than one of these ways, there is no
necessity that it do so. The difference between the two sorts of iconic signs discussed
previously amounts to the difference between a relatively simple icon and a sign
which uses an icon but is also symbolic.
One way of expressing the difference is to
point out that icons (and indices) are natural signs while symbols require convention.
In the case of the painting the point is that
someone has chosen to exhibit an icon of a
scene as an icon. By a conventional symbolism associated with the practices of art our
attention is called to the fact that the icon
is meant to be an icon.
We might consider, briefly, the proposal
that a work of art represents its object indexically. Thus, it might be suggested that
a Pollock painting is an index of Pollock's
action in making the painting. This must
be at least part of the truth. Just as the
bullet hole in mouldy bread (to use Peirce's
example) is an index of the bullet's being
fired, so these drippings and scrapings are
indices of a series of actions in which Pollock dripped and scraped paint. Surely the
arrangement of paint is not iconic of Pollock's action, for it does not resemble human movements (although it may, accidentally or not, be iconic of something else).
Yet there is a distinction to be made between a sign incorporating an index and
being an index without qualification. My
painted walls are also an index of my activity in painting or, better, a scraped surface
is al index of the scraper's scraping. Now
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Pollock's painting may be said to exhibit its
indexical character, while my painted or
scraped walls will hopefully not be regarded as indices but as walls.
The relation of the art-sign to its object,
then, is not iconic or indexical, but symbolic; it represents by means of a conventional symbolism rather than by being a
natural sign. This conclusion is not innocuous, for there are strong theoretical tendencies to construe things otherwise. For expression theorists the enduring vehicle in the
situation is a sign of a certain experience of
the artist's in just the same way that a cry
of pain or a gesture is a sign of someone's
state of mind. A concomitant of this approach is that that which is distinctive of
art must be found not in the kind of sign
process which art is, but in a special property of the object represented. So Collingwood supposes that the artist expresses
emotion in a distinctive and final form; the
ultimate emotion in artistic expression is a
completely determinate individual feeling,
and the artist is distinguished from other
men by his ability to achieve this definitive
articulation. Dewey takes the object to be
"an experience" characterized by its inclusiveness, organic unity, and consummatory
quality. A consequence of these theories of
art as a natural sign is to make the notion
of art much more elastic than it is ordinarily taken to be. On the one hand, much
which passes as art in the considered judgment of critics and audiences is to be excluded if the artist's experience is not of the
paradigmatic type; and much which we do
not ordinarily take to be art replaces it
because it may be correlated with the experience in question.

The truth of theories of the CollingwoodDewey type lies in the claim that works of
art, to be such, must be regarded as human
products. Following this suggestion, it may
be appropriate to revise an earlier suggestion by finding at least this generic feature
of the objects of art-signs: they must be
human intentions or experiences. What I
want to stress is that these experiences or
intentions are represented symbolically,
rather than naturally; and I am dubious of
attempts, like Dewey's and Collingwood's,
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to delineate in much detail what these intentions or experiences must be. If we begin
with those things which are usually taken
to be works of art, we find an indefinite
variety of such intentions; while if we begin
by specifying the intentions in advance we
find it impossible to correlate these particular sorts of intentions with that which we
take to be art. Those who have spoken of
an "intentional fallacy" have generally
been thinking of the tendency to understand art in terms of extra-artistic intentions of some kind, such as the sublimated
expression of repressed desires, or participating in the class struggle. As practical
advice to critics and audiences this admonition is excellent. What it seems to overlook
is the need to discern the particular way in
which we are to regard a work of art. When
we interpret a piece of literature, for example, we look for what Northrop Frye calls
the "radical of presentation," the voice with
which the work speaks. The narrator may
be an omniscient story teller, as in the epic,
or a solitary voice overheard, as in the lyric
mode. In painting, to use an example of
Panofsky's, a "city in the sky" may be a
vision, an actual heavenly city, or simply a
far off city represented by an unusual set of
conventions; the painting itself, as a surface, does not resolve the ambiguity.3 To do
that we need to see the painting as a sign of
an intention to represent the city in some
particular way.
The situation described here has a certain amount of looseness about it. We interpret an art-sign as having some intention as
its object, but we are never in a position to
give an exhaustive catalogue of the basic
types of artistic intention. If we abandoned
the first restriction, it would be possible to
construct a completely morphological aesthetics, making reference to the immediately presented qualities and structures of
art-objects; but as Gombrich has suggested
this would result in our seeing no significant difference between two paintings with
similar morphology, even though one was
extremely traditional and the other a daring innovation.4 The second limitation
arises from the fact that one of the things
which art does is not simply to seek new
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material but to present what it does in new
ways. Many artistic intentions are to be
understood as revisions or comments upon
previous traditions and styles; so to anticipate the possible forms of the artist's intention would be to do his work for him.
It might be suggested that all this talk
about the necessity of intention as the object of the artistic sign simply amounts to
the old and trivial claim that works of art
must be artifacts. However, there are some
complications. On the semiotic account
given here, works of art are not only artifacts; they manifest or exhibit their artifactuality. And just as it is not clear that there
is any exhaustive account of the ways in
which something may be presented as an
artifact, so there is no apparent limitation
on what might count as an artifact. Duchamp's urinal and similar ready-mades
seem to have established that the artist
need not be an artificer (in the sense of a
planner or craftsman). Natural objects, too,
might be taken to be artifacts in an extended sense if someone exhibits them as
works of art; so a piece of driftwood or a
patterned slab of marble become artifacts,
in a sense, because someone exhibits them
in a certain way.
I am suggesting that we need to take an
empirical and pluralistic approach to the
nature of intention in two ways. On the
one hand, the history of art reveals an indefinite variety of artistic purposes or ends:
think of Byzantine mosaics, Bartok's music,
and Pope's poetry. Each of the many intentional theories of interpretation is probably
useful in helping us to discern types of artistic intent of which we might otherwise be
ignorant. Yet each fails in its claims to have
discovered the fundamental form of intention for all art. Moreover artistic intention
often exhibits what Freud calls over-determination; there may be a complex network of
purposes involved in the production of a
work, even to the point where we hesitate
to say that they are all summed up in a
single dominant intention. A second respect
in which theory should be methodologically
pluralistic is in questions about the analysis
of intention itself, i.e., whether it is to be
construed as an introspectible mental event,
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a set of dispositions to act, or in some other
fashion. Certainly we often do attribute intentions to artists which they could not
have articulated themselves. Empirical
method requires us to admit that intentions
may simply be more or less vague, complex,
linguistically formulable by the agent, and
so on. However, this pluralistic account of
intention need not be taken as excluding
the possibility of a comprehensive aesthetic
theory; for such a theory may deal with the
relations between intention, art object, and
interpretation (as does the semiotic account) while surrendering the attempt to
find a determinate form of all artistic intentions. Of course intention, if it is to play a
role in the theory should have some common nature underlying its plurality of
forms; yet this nature may be of a very
general and even vague sort.
II
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is to be properly interpreted. The appropriate response is held to be emotional, or
cognitive, or active; more specifically, various theorists have held that it is an emotion like or unlike those we experience in
everyday life, that it is propositional knowledge about the world or a kind of intuition,
or that it is a reorganization of our practical attitudes or an acceptance of our tragic
condition. However, it seems to me that the
failure to identify the interpretant of the
art-sign is not a weakness of the semiotic
theory, but one of its strengths.
To ask, as Stevenson does, that we say
what the interpretant of the sign is, is to
misunderstand both what it is to be a sign
and, more specifically, what it is to be a
work of art. A sign is the sort of thing
which requires interpretation, but to which
no single interpretant is adequate. This situation arises from the fact that the interpretant of a sign is itself a sign. A single
sign is indeterminate in meaning insofar as
it is capable of giving rise to a multiplicity
of interpretants at a given time and to an
indefinite series of interpretants over a period of time. But how and for what reason
would we want to single out one of these
interpretants as the only proper meaning of
a sign? Now of course we do frequently
believe that we know the meaning of a concept, a theory, or even of a work of art.
Peirce, for example, developed his pragmatism as a method of discovering the ultimate or final interpretant of a sign (or at
least of an "intellectual concept"). So perhaps what is needed is an account of the
interpretants of art-signs in particular,
rather than a consideration of the question
whether any sign must have a unique
meaning; for it may turn out that there are
quite different types of signs. If this is the
case, then it may also be possible to distinguish artistic semiosis from other kinds of

Supposing that this account of art as symbolic of intentions is accepted, can we go
on to identify the meaning of a work of art
with the artist's intention? This step has
been taken without too much hesitation by
intentionalistic theorists such as Erwin Panofsky and Albert Hofstadter.5 However, it
is not clear that this identification is either
necessary or permissible. For while the artist's intention, as the object of the art-sign,
is a condition of the sign's being meaningful, it is not identical with the sign's meaning. This can be put in more technical
terms: the meaning of the sign is not the
sign's object but its interpretant or the rule
by which it determines its interpretant.
The sign's meaning is what it will be interpreted as. In order to talk about the meaning of a work of art, then, we must talk
about its interpretation.
Some doubts concerning semiotic aesthetics have focused on just this question of our signification.
It has been suggested, by Panofsky and
ability to locate the interpretant of a work
of art. Stevenson seems to suggest that since others, that to understand a work of art we
no one has been able to say what the go through the same sort of process as when
unique interpretant of an aesthetic sign is, we understand a gesture.6 A gesture is supthe semiotic theory is radically incomplete. posed to be symbolic of an intention on the
Now of course there are a variety of theo- part of the gesturer; we can, in principle,
ries which purport to say how a work of art understand the meaning of a gesture by
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taking account of appropriate evidence concerning social conventions or temperamental peculiarities. In the case of works of
art, the evidence is much more complex, for
we need to know about stylistic conventions
or iconographical material as well as understanding the general cultural background
of the work; this simply renders the interpreter's or iconologist's task a difficult but
not an impossible one. Yet there seems to
be some disanalogies of art and gesture
which should also be noted. A gesture is
usually addressed to a quite definite and
limited audience, while works of art tend to
be of a more public nature. This, in turn, is
connected with the fact that art tends to be
enduring while gestures are ephemeral. (Exceptions to both principles may be found,
but it is significant that these differences
hold in the primary cases). These variations
are significant, because our supposition that
the gesture has a determinate meaning is
supported by its dependence on a specific
context which furnishes us with the clues to
its meaning; but the art object, while it
arises out of a particular historical, social,
and personal context endures so that it acquires a life beyond that context. This endurance seems to be more than an accidental feature, so much so that it is puzzling
when artists turn, as recently, to the fabrication of deliberately ephemeral works. It
could be said that the work manages to
escape or transcend its original context only
to take a place within a larger one which
might be called the "art-world." But to suppose that we can now discern the unique
meaning of the work by understanding the
conventions of its new context is to beg the
question; for it may be that these conventions are such as to preclude the assignment
of a single meaning to the work.7
This last possibility seems closer to the
practice of critics and audiences than does
Panofsky's analogy. A work of art characteristically is susceptible of many interpretations, although not all interpretations that are offered are acceptable. We may
see Don Quixote as a madman, a tragic ironist, a metaphysician, or as a representative of
the decaying gentry, but we cannot understand him coherently as a peasant or the king
in disguise. One reason that we return to the
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same work again and again, while we allow
gestures to pass into oblivion, is that we continue to find new meanings or new interpretations of the former, but not of the latter.
This partial indeterminacy of the sign in
art can be accounted for in terms of some
of the general characteristics of signs. A
sign does not determine its own interpretation, but requires interpretation. This is
especially true of symbols, which are signs
primarily by virtue of a law or convention
rather than by having a natural connection
with their object. At any time, there is a
limited continuum of possible interpretations available of a given symbol. So a work
of art admits of an indefinite number of
possible interpretations within a given range,
but it may exclude those that fall outside of
this range. This can be illustrated most perspicuously, perhaps, in the case of the performing arts: we can imagine an indefinite
number of ways to produce Hamlet or to
arrange a symphony, even if certain kinds of
production or arrangement are precluded.
This situation is not limited to the performing arts, however; a painting or a poem must
be taken in some way by its viewer or reader.
Perhaps there is more freedom of interpretation in these non-performing arts, for the
viewers and readers are not subject to the
many constraints of a practical nature which
may restrict the freedom of the performer,
such as limited resources and the necessity of
finding an audience.
It has sometimes been suggested that we
ought to distinguish rather sharply between
the performer's interpretation and the
critic's or audience's understanding of a
work.8 So it is claimed that scripts and
scores do require interpretation or performance while poems and paintings are more
complete and need only be read or seen.
There is a difference here, but it does not
seem to me that it affects the general thrust
of the semiotic theory. For my seeing or reading of a work is just as much mine as the
performer's playing is his interpretation: in
each case the work must be taken in a certain way by emphasizing some aspects
rather than others or by seeing things in a
particular light. Of course, the performing
arts introduce additional complications, for
I may interpret a performance of Hamlet

Intention and Interpretation in Art
rather than the script. The analogy of the
two kinds of arts becomes clearer if we
think of a poem as a script for its readers;
to read a poem aloud is to implicitly or
explicitly adopt a certain understanding or
interpretation of it which is indicated by
modulations of the voice. Silent readings
are derivative from readings aloud, although some poems may be sufficiently
complex to preclude the possibility of articulating all of the aspects of a given
interpretation by means of the voice alone.
The idea that this indeterminacy of
interpretation can be eliminated by introducing the notion of the work of art as a
type, of which its various performances or
interpretations are tokens does not seem to
be of much interest. For supposing that we
adopt such a terminology, which may be
illuminating in some ways, the question remains as to whether the type itself is fully
determinate. It may be that the type is indeterminate in the sense that it has a legitimate variety of interpretants at a given
time; but it may also be indeterminate by
being capable of changing or growing. Let
us return to the analogy of art and gesture.
The gesture has the meaning that it does
because of the contextual limitations ordinarily associated with it. But what are the
contextual limitations on the meaning of a
work of art? Isn't it a feature of the practices and conventions of art that we are led
to see new meanings in a work because of
changes in style and approach which postdate the work of art itself? Primitive masks,
late Hellenistic sculpture and mannerist
painting do come to be seen in a new light
after the growth and popularity of nonrepresentational modes in the visual arts.
Of course, it might be suggested that this is
a naive kind of projection of our own concerns and prejudices onto the past. Such
projection does occur when we attempt to
understand the gestures or customs of the
past as if they were contemporary; we
might, through ignorance or lack of imagination, understand the hand-shaking of
armed men in terms of our present social
habit. Yet the analogy with gesture is to be
used with care. For the work of art endures
and is offered to a relatively non-specific
public which revises its understanding of
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art continuously. Just as a dramatist may be
aware of offering his audience a script
which admits of many possible productions
and interpretations, so artists have recently
come to think of their works as subject to
undergoing drastic transformations of critical appraisal as stylistic change accelerates
in the arts. In semiotic terms, we may say
that symbols grow through their interpretation. The work of art is what Peirce calls a
"living" symbol, like a constitution or a social practice, which retains its identity
through change.9 Often the meaning of a
work of art grows through its interpretation
by other works, as well as through critical
understanding. It is not only pastiches, like
Picasso's of Velasquez, but whole stylistic
movements which comment on and articulate the meaning of others, as in the case of
the mannerist revision of renaissance perspectivism.
There is some limitation on this interpretative freedom which stems from the artist's
intention and from the fact that the product (or the sign in the sign relationship) is
an opaque element which prevents
interpretation from ever coinciding precisely with intention. Paul Valery has suggested that this situation gives rise to a "creative misunderstanding" in which the work
is destined to have more meanings for its
collective audience than it does for its producer.10 If art were or approximated to
being a direct means of communication (as
some have supposed) then the work would
tend to be a disposable instrument which
would be exhausted by achieving a definite
effect. The kind of opacity and indeterminacy detected by critics like Valery can perhaps be accounted for categorially by reference to the indeterminacy of signs.
There are two main ways of denying this
indeterminacy of artistic meaning which it
may be helpful to examine. The first tends
to fall back on the conception of a determinate meaning for each work, while the second denies that there is any work which is
identical in the various situations of performance and interpretation. Two varieties
of the first position are of special interest;
one takes the meaning to be identical with
the experience or intention of the artist
while the other takes it to be a kind of limit
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which our various perceptions of the work
tend to approximate. Collingwood's theory
is a good example of the former sort of
approach, and its is significant that his most
obvious difficulty is to account for the status
of the work as embodied in a medium (the
sign-vehicle). Since he identifies the work
with a determinate expression of the artist's
and treats the embodied work as a kind of
dead shell, he is forced to regard critical or
audience response as aiming at a kind of
total identity with the artist's experience.
Although he wants to claim that art flourishes when there is some reciprocal relation
between the artist's experience and the audience's understanding, his categorical apparatus does not allow him any systematic
way of recognizing this reciprocity.11
Alternatively, it has been suggested by
Stephen Pepper and others that the work of
art is the ideal limit of an infinite series of
perceptions.l2 But why should we assume
that informed and critical perception will
tend to converge on one interpretation or
understanding of the work? We may very
well eliminate some possible interpretations
by such a process, but there is no reason, to
expect convergence on a single critical object.
In terms of semiotic categories, it seems
that Collingwood's theory depends upon
collapsing the sign relationship by omitting
tlhe central element-the sign itself. This
leaves identity as the only possible relation
between the artist and his audience. Pepper
on the other hand, would eliminate the
sign's object and reconstitute the sign relation between the sign and its interpretant.
But once the sign's object has been eliminated, what principle remains by which the
plurality of interpretations may be limited?
Dewey seems to have recognized this difficulty, at least implicitly, by suggesting that
each act of aesthetic perception creates a
new work of art. For Dewey the "work" of
art is literally what it is in a particular
experience.l3 We might say that Dewey's
version of the sign relationship recognizes
only the interpretant. All of these attempts
to evade the idea of indeterminacy seem to
be phenomenologically false, insofar as we
are not disturbed at allowing that there
may quite legitimately be a continuum of
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possible interpretations of a single work;
moreover we want to insist that it is the
same work which lends itself to these different interpretations. One reason for this insistence is that experience with art is enriched by coming back to a work and seeing
it freshly; on Dewey's account we could
never do this.
It might be suggested that on this account the supreme work of art would be a
figure like Rorschach's ink-blots, which is
indefinitely susceptible of interpretation.
Surely no theory in aesthetics could be
more compelling than is our knowledge of
the artistic inferiority of Rorschach's figures
to, say, a Rembrandt. The differences between the Rorschach and the Rembrandt
are illuminating, however. For one thing,
while the Rorschach may in a sense give
rise to a greater diversity of interpretations
(is it an evil wizard or a peaceful pond?)
these interpretations have little interrelation and the viewer, having produced a
few, quickly tires of the game. The Rembrandt typically gives rise to a variety of
interpretations which not only tend to be
interrelated but also to be augmented by
additional viewings. Moreover, it seems to
be precisely the more determinate intention
of the artist which accounts for the greater
interpretability of the painting. In art, as
perhaps in political life, the relation between freedom and constraint is not simply
an inverse proportional. To develop this
notion we would need to have what Peirce
called a "logic of vagueness." Until we do,
it should be noted that we are able to make
distinctions between the trivially and the
richly vague. The relation of the two products considered should cause no surprise to
those acquainted with the arts, for the same
contrast can be observed on a larger scale
between a complex and rich artistic tradition which offers a wealth of possibilities to
the artist and one with few constraints and
little substance where the possibilities for
innovation are not provided by the context.
To put the point in a metaphysical way,
it is not the case that when something becomes more determinate it also becomes less
indeterminate; rather it may lose its indeterminacy in certain respects while acquiring other types, perhaps unanticipated.14
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So, presented with a blank canvas and taking a negative attitude toward all traditions, the artist may have few real possibilities of construction although his logical
possibilities may be infinite. Conversely, a
highly developed style and iconography do
not repress the painter's expression but provide expressive possibilities. The same
holds true of the interpreter's situation.
The blank canvas offers only trivial possibilities of interpretation, unless supported
by contextual evidence which leads us to
see it as a definite move in some style or
tradition as is the case with much contemporary "impoverished" art. On the other
hand, difficult and intricate works like the
Bible and the Homeric epics have been the
constant delight of interpreters for centuries.

41

may blend or condense several different aspects of signification. Whereas a concept is
expressed by a word, the material aspect of
the word does not contribute to its meaning
and may actually hinder communication if
it is hard to pronounce or write. When
language is employed poetically, on the
other hand, it is difficult to separate its
meaning as poetry from the sound-sequence. In the sculptures of George Segal
or the paintings of Jasper Johns, the materiality of the signs is emphasized so as to
make their iconicity somewhat suspect. The
types of complexity that arise in art can be
regarded mainly in terms of this convergence of various elements which might be
separated, for the sake of clarity, in other
situations.l5

One way of achieving such complexity is
to combine various types of representation
in a single product. A painting may be an
III
icon of a certain scene, an index of the
At this point it seems necessary to ask painter's brush-strokes and a symbol of his
whether the semiotic theory enables us to intentions. In other kinds of symbolism this
distinguish art from other sign activities. over-determination may be confusing or acInsofar as any sign has some indeterminacy cidental, but in art it is central. Another
about it, nothing interesting has been type of complexity is obtained by stressing
learned about signs in art. We might be the various aspects of the sign vehicle: a
inclined to suggest, then, that the ambigu- sculpture is a sign of a general order (what
ity or indeterminacy in art is no more se- Peirce calls a legisign) because it is endurvere than in other areas and may be mini- ing or repeatable; so is a word or a concept.
mized, if not eliminated, by the application Moreover, each requires to be instantiated
of certain tests and procedures. In this by vehicles with some material aspectsense, the theory might say too much about sounds or marks in the case of the word and
symbols in art by assimilating them to all a metallic surface, perhaps, in the other.
other signs, and providing no grounds for Additionally the sign will have some immedistinguishing them from these other signs. diate quality-the way that the words look
Suppose we ask how, on the semiotic ac- or sound and the immediate visual or taccount, a work of art is different from a tile aspect of the sculpture. A work of art
concept. Both are symbols rather than icons will characteristically manifest all these asor indices. Both require interpretation and pects at the same time and their intercontheir proper type of interpretant is of a nection will be important for determining
general or logical variety. Peirce claims that the way in which the sign is to be taken;
all symbols grow, although the responsible ordinarily we will not pay too much atteninquirer in science or philosophy will at- tion to the sound of a word and almost
tempt to limit this growth as much as possi- none at all to its physical vehicle, because
ble. All symbols must themselves be general we rightly suppose that these are related
and repeatable: concepts are expressed in peripherally, if at all, to its meaning.
words and works of art can be described by
The sign process in art can also be distina notation if they are not associated with guished from others by noting some characsome enduring thing like a canvas or a text. teristic features of the attitude or type of
One important difference, however, seems intelligence which art requires. When
to hinge on the way in which a sign in art Peirce discusses the characteristics of signs
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he seems to have in mind the purposes of a
sign-user who has an interest in discovering
the correct or proper meaning of a sign,
and his pragmatic principle is intended to
help such a sign-user clarify and determine
his meanings or ideas. If such a sign-user is
called a "scientific intelligence" (as Peirce
suggests) then it may be that we need to
account also for the workings of the artistic
intelligence. Whereas the scientific intelligence has an interest in fixing meaning the
artistic intelligence is committed to multiplying meaning. This may simply be another way of expressing a Kantian type of
contrast between the theoretical and aesthetic attitudes: in the theoretical attitude
we attempt to see things as exemplifications
of definite concepts, while in the aesthetic
attitude we tend to contemplate something
in a variety of ways or see it in a number of
different lights, without feeling a need to
focus on only one of these ways or lights.
We could say that signs of various types
succeed one another according to different
sorts of laws or practices. Peirce calls the
science which "ascertain[s] the laws by
which in every scientific intelligence one
sign gives birth to another" pure rhetoric.
But might we not conceive of different
types of rhetoric which would deal with
different types of sign uses? In some areas,
the sign-process tends to converge: the possibility or the hope of such a convergence
seems to be the ground of scientific inquiry.
A scientific criticism will wish to apply this
model to the study of art, supposing that
the "true" meaning of the work is a kind of
limit of the process of critical inquiry. It is
important to remember, however, that this
model does not flow simply from the structure of the sign-relationship but is only one
way in which signs may "succeed one another."
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